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I am very pleased to have the 
opportunity to share with you my thoughts 
on a very timely topic in America—welfare 
reform, a topic that has been very dominant 
in the news.  And a good deal of the 
discussion has focused on the impact of this 
legislation on welfare recipients and the 
receipt of welfare.   
But I must say that many of the 
explanations for the observed changes in 
welfare behavior are based on faulty 
assumptions and tend to ignore competing 
explanations for why the welfare 
population has sharply declined since the 
passage of this legislation. 
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As we approach the period when Congress 
has to reauthorize the welfare reform bill, I see 
my role as a social scientist in the following 
way: to use empirical evidence as a basis for 
examining critically assumptions about welfare 
reform --including assumptions that led to the 
passage of the welfare reform legislation, and 
the continued use of these assumptions to 
explain changes in the welfare population 
since the enactment of this historic piece of 
legislation in 1996.  I hold to the view that we 
cannot make wise policy decisions without 
adequate information.  My talk today is 
motivated by this view, which includes, in the 
latter part, a discussion of my current research. 
When I lecture on issues of poverty and 
welfare policy in the United States I like to 
begin by placing the issues in a broader cross-
cultural perspective.  Despite the increasing 
strains on the European welfare state and cries 
to cut back on welfare benefits so as to combat 
unemployment, there are notable differences 
between the United States and Europe in the 
 3 
extent to which problems of poverty and 
inequality are addressed.   
In contrast to many European nations, the 
United States has not created comprehensive 
programs to promote the social rights of 
American citizens, including rights to 
employment, economic security, education, 
and health care.  Social rights!   
 In comparison with Canada and most 
western European countries, social rights in 
the United States are less developed and less 
intertwined with political and civil rights.  
Although social rights increased in the United 
States after World War II, with the rise of social 
security and other benefits, they have yet to 
reach the levels enjoyed by the citizens of 
Western Europe.  For example, American 
housing policies to promote home ownership 
have tended to benefit the working and middle 
classes, not the poor.  "Direct financial housing 
subsidies for low-income families, common in 
European welfare states, have been virtually 
non-existent in the United States."  
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 The housing made available to the poor in 
the United States tends to be confined to a 
limited number of public projects 
disproportionately concentrated in inner-city 
neighborhoods far from employment 
opportunities and informal job information 
networks.  Moreover, western European 
societies have always had a much more 
comprehensive program of unemployment 
insurance, and the gap has widened each year 
since the U.S. program lost ground in the early 
years of the Reagan administration 
 Finally, in western European countries, 
where services such as medical care are 
considered the basic right of all citizens, the 
poor tend to be covered by the same 
comprehensive medical programs as the 
working and middle classes.  In the United 
States, however, Medicaid, a health program 
for poor people, pays doctors much less than 
either Medicare or private health insurers pay 
for the same services.  As a result, many 
doctors refuse to take Medicaid patients, and 
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many medical procedures required to treat 
certain illnesses are not covered by Medicaid.   
Moreover, anti-poverty programs have 
been narrowly targeted and fragmented.  The 
most rapid growth in expenditures for U.S. 
welfare programs has been in universal 
entitlements such as Social Security and 
Medicare--programs whose elderly recipients 
tend to be members of the working and middle 
classes. 
  Food stamps, Medicaid, and the 
Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) 
do provide some relief for the poor, but as 
currently designed, they have little effect on 
the poverty rates among the non-elderly.  In 
short, targeted programs for the poor in the 
United States do not even begin to address 
inequities in the social class system.  Instead of 
helping to integrate the recipients into the 
broader economic and social life of mainstream 
society--as the GI bill and the postwar federal 
mortgage programs did for working- and 
middle-class whites—these targeted programs 
tend to stigmatize and separate the poor. 
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 Furthermore, although economic inequality 
has increased in all western democracies in the 
last several decades, unlike in the United States 
official and scholarly explanations of the 
widening gap between the haves and have-
nots in Europe tend to focus much more on the 
changes and inequities in the broader society, 
than on individual deficiencies and behavior.  
Therefore, public rhetoric lends much greater 
support to the ideology of social citizenship 
rights—the right to employment, economic 
security, health care, education, and so on.     
 Also, welfare programs that benefit wide 
segments of the population, such as child care, 
children allowances (an annual benefit per 
child), housing subsidies, education, medical 
care, and unemployment insurance have been 
firmly institutionalized in many western 
European democracies.  Efforts to cut back on 
these programs in the face of growing 
joblessness do not just threaten the poor, and 
thus they have met firm resistance from 
working- and middle-class citizens. 
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 However, in the United States not only do 
welfare programs that benefit the poor lack 
institutional safeguards, but the basic belief 
system concerning the nature and causes of 
poverty and welfare frames economic and 
social outcomes mainly in individual terms.  
This allows conservative intellectuals and 
policymakers to overemphasize the negative 
aspects of persistent joblessness and the receipt 
of welfare by playing on the key individualistic 
and moralistic themes of this dominant 
American belief system.  Accordingly, the 
tragic nature and social causes of such 
problems are lost on a public that holds truly 
disadvantaged groups, such as inner-city 
minorities, largely responsible for their plight.  
 The public framing of social outcomes has 
profound implications for the proposals 
advanced by members of society to address 
sensitive problems like inner-city poverty and 
joblessness.  Beliefs that associate joblessness 
and poverty with individual shortcomings do 
not generate strong support for social  
programs intended to end inequality.  No one 
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understood this idea better than the British 
social scientist T. H. Marshall.  If we follow his 
classic thesis on the development of 
citizenship, we see that when the fundamental 
principle linking poverty to the social class and 
racial structure is recognized or acknowledged 
in Western society, the emphasis on the rights 
of citizens will tend to go beyond civil and 
political rights to include social rights--that is, 
"the whole range from the right to a modicum 
of economic welfare and security to the right to 
share to the full in the social heritage and to 
live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in the society." 
 However, as critics of American approaches 
to the study of poverty and welfare have 
shown repeatedly, concerns about the civil and 
political aspects of citizenship in the United 
States (unlike in Europe) have overshadowed 
concerns about the social aspects of citizenship 
because of a strong belief system that de-
emphasizes the social origins and social 
significance of poverty and welfare.  
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  Data from public opinion polls consistently 
indicate that Americans tend to be far more 
concerned about the duties or social obligations 
of the poor, particularly the welfare poor, than 
about their social rights as American citizens.  
As far back as the New Deal, Americans have 
persistently debated whether recipients of 
welfare checks should be required to work.  
Public opinion polls over the years have 
revealed strong support for a work 
requirement for those on welfare.   
Underlying such overwhelming public 
sentiment against welfare is the belief that the 
moral character of individuals, not inequities 
in the social and economic structure of society, 
is at the root of the problem.  In recent opinion 
polls, for example, more than 9 out of 10 
Americans felt that lack of effort was either 
very or somewhat important as a cause of 
poverty.  Fewer than 10 percent felt that it was 
not important.  Such findings contrast sharply 
with those based on similar surveys conducted 
in 12 European countries (the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, France, Denmark, Belgium, 
 10 
the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Italy).  Citizens of 
these countries favored structural explanations 
(such as lack of jobs) over individual 
explanations by a wide margin.  Two-thirds of 
the Europeans associated poverty with either 
social injustice, misfortune, or changes in the 
modern world.  Over the years only 15 to 17 
percent felt that poverty was the result of 
laziness or a lack of will power—popular 
individual explanations in the United States.   
Americans are especially critical of the 
welfare poor.  Recent national surveys reveal 
widespread support for the notion that most 
welfare recipients do not share the majority 
view about the importance of hard work.  
Indeed, a liberal-conservative consensus on 
welfare reform emerged in the latter 1980s that 
features two themes:  (1) the receipt of welfare 
should be predicated on reciprocal 
responsibilities whereby society is obligated to 
provide assistance to welfare applicants, who, 
in turn, are obligated to behave in socially 
endorsed ways, and (2) able-bodied adult 
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welfare recipients should be required to 
prepare themselves for work, to search for 
employment, and to accept jobs when they are 
offered.  These points of agreement have been 
the focus of a good deal of the public 
discussions concerning welfare reform since 
then.  
 These two themes are based on the implicit 
assumption that a sort of mysterious "welfare 
ethos" exists that encourages public assistance 
recipients to avoid their obligations as citizens 
to be educated, to work, to support their 
families, and to obey the law.  In other words,  
"it is the moral fabric of individuals, not the social 
and economic structure of society, that is taken to be 
the root of the problem."  
During the period of rising inequality, the 
period from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s, 
the period when ordinary working Americans 
were struggling to make ends meet, political 
arguments that embodied such assumptions—
that the moral fabric of individuals is the root 
of the problem-- resonated with the general 
public and, I believe, contributed to the drastic 
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decline in state support for the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 
prior to the signing of the 1996 welfare reform 
bill.  
  Families receiving AFDC were far worse 
off in 1995 than those who had received public 
assistance twenty years earlier.  Between 1975 
and 1995, after adjusting for inflation, the 
benefit level had declined in every state, so 
much so that the average real value of AFDC 
nationwide had plummeted 37 percent during 
this period.  Increases in food stamp benefits 
slightly cushioned, but far from offset, the 
losses in AFDC purchasing power.  "Between 
July 1972 and 1992, the combined value of 
AFDC and food stamps for a three-person 
family with no countable income dropped 26% 
on average.”  
 The erosion of AFDC benefits became a 
landslide after 1991.  Only six states (Alabama, 
Arizona, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, and 
South Dakota) maintained or increased the 
level of benefits between January 1991 and 
January 1994.  Benefit levels were actually cut 
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in nine states, sometimes more than once, and 
they did not keep pace with inflation in the 
remaining states.  Never in the history of the 
program had so “many states enacted such 
deep cuts for so many families over such a 
short time period."   
 When Congress initiated the legislative 
process to convert AFDC to block grants, 
relating benefit levels to housing costs could 
perhaps best assess the plight of AFDC 
families.  In nearly every state, the full monthly 
AFDC benefit was not sufficient to cover the 
costs of "what the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) considers to 
be 'decent, safe, and sanitary' housing of a 
'modest' nature."   
The Center on Social Welfare Policy and 
Law found that in 78 of 95 representative 
localities across the United States, the fair 
market rent (FMR) for two-bedroom housing 
was more than the total monthly benefit for an 
AFDC family of three.  "In cities like Newark, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, Denver, Atlanta, New 
Orleans, St. Louis, and Memphis, the AFDC 
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benefit [was] less than two-thirds of the FMR 
for two-bedroom housing."  Housing subsidies 
did not offset these deficiencies.  In fact, only 
23 percent of all AFDC families received some 
form of housing subsidy or lived in public 
housing in 1992. 
 The collapse of support for AFDC 
recipients was related to fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of welfare and 
welfare families, including the beliefs that most 
welfare families are long- term recipients and 
that most are black women with many 
children. But studies that analyze welfare data, 
including monthly data on who receives how 
much welfare, challenge these assumptions.  
Only a minority of the AFDC recipients were 
African-American in 1995, and the average 
number of children in welfare families was 
slightly less than the average number in non-
welfare families.  Moreover, the research based 
on monthly data indicates that the AFDC 
welfare population was very dynamic, that is, 
subject to frequent change.   
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 Prior to the signing of the 1996 welfare 
reform bill, people tended to go on and off 
welfare in short spurts, and about one-third 
had been on welfare more than once.  Half of 
all welfare recipients exited welfare during the 
first year, and three-quarters departed within 
two years.  Many of those who quickly exited 
the welfare rolls during the first year, however, 
returned.   
There was considerable movement between 
welfare and work.  Many mothers would go off 
welfare and enter low-wage employment, try 
unsuccessfully to make ends meet, and then 
return to welfare.  Some repeated this pattern 
again and again.  Also, recent research reveals 
that it is not the lack of work ethic that causes 
these mothers to return or remain on welfare.  
Not only did they prefer work to welfare, but 
permanent welfare receipt was anathema to 
them.   
 As unemployment in the general 
population rises, the probability of exiting 
welfare diminishes.  It is not surprising that 
those who are least employable in terms of 
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skills and training are least successful in 
avoiding welfare.  The longer a mother 
remains off welfare, the less likely it is that she 
will return.  An examination of the long-term 
data on multiple spells of welfare reflects the 
high turnover.  Thirty percent of welfare 
recipients were on AFDC for less than two 
years, and 50 percent received welfare for less 
than four years.  These figures include 
recipients who have gone off and then 
returned to welfare during these periods.  Only 
15 percent remained continuously on welfare 
for five years or more.    
Long-term welfare mothers tended to be 
racial minorities, never-married individuals, 
high school dropouts and those who lack 
employment experiences.  "The overall picture 
[was] that one group [used] welfare for 
relatively short periods of time and never 
[returned].  A middle group [cycled] on and 
off, some for short periods and others for 
longer periods, but again, not for five 
continuous  years.  And a third, but quite small 
group, [stayed] on for long periods of time."   
 17 
As the Northwestern University sociologist 
Kathryn Edin points out, we often fail to 
consider that when AFDC was still in 
operation "states set . . . benefits too low to live 
on.  Because of this basic fact, women had to 
supplement their welfare income with either 
unreported work or covert contributions from 
boyfriends, friends or relatives."  Moreover, we 
also often ignore the fact that "low-wage jobs 
[often] do not pay enough to support a family . 
. . and offer little access to better-paying jobs."  
Indeed, Edin found that those who left 
[welfare] for work were “even more likely to 
be poor in the second year after leaving 
welfare than they were in the first."  
 Why? Simply because many low-wage jobs 
do not provide health care benefits, and most 
working mothers had to pay for transportation, 
spend more for child care, and purchase better 
clothing.  Working mothers also had to spend 
more for housing because it is more difficult 
for them to qualify for housing subsidies.   
With these additional expenses, Edin estimated 
that the average low-income working mother 
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would have to spend $317 a month more [in 
1995 dollars] than her welfare counterpart to 
maintain the same standard of living.  Edin 
states:  
These figures mean that the average mother 
who left welfare for full-time work would 
experience at least a 33 percent gap 
between what she could expect to earn and 
what she would need to earn to meet her 
expenses.  Any profit she might gain from 
her work would be eaten up by the extra 
costs associated with leaving welfare for a 
job, meaning that she would have to 
continue generating large amounts of 
outside income.  However, since she would 
be working a full-time job she would have 
less available time in which to do so.   
 Edin's research revealed that since the 
working mothers could not live solely on the 
income from their full-time, low-wage jobs, 
they had to generate considerable outside 
income to make ends meet, including income 
from overtime hours or second jobs, earned 
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income tax credits, food stamps, and the 
contributions of relatives and friends.   
It is not surprising, therefore, that many 
welfare-reliant mothers chose not to enter the 
formal labor market.  It would not have been in 
their best economic interest to do so.  Given the 
economic realities, it is also not surprising that 
many who had been working in these low-
wage jobs decided to rely on or return to 
welfare. 
For example, in our Chicago research one 
welfare mother from a South Side poverty 
neighborhood explained her decision to remain 
on welfare in 1988, even though she would like 
"to go out there and get a job."  She states: 
I was workin' and then I had two kids.  
And I'm struggling.  I was making, like, 
close to seven dollars an hour. . . . I had to 
pay a babysitter.  Then I had to deal with 
my kids when I got home.  And I couldn't 
even afford medical insurance. . . . I was so 
scared, when my kids were sick or 
somethin', . . . because I have been turned 
away from a hospital because I did not 
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have a medical card.  I don't like being on 
public aid.  But . . . what do I do when my 
kids get sick? 
 In the early 1990s, based on the influential 
writings of the social scientist David Ellwood, 
my colleague at Harvard, a comprehensive 
liberal vision of welfare reform that 
highlighted the dignity of work and challenged 
some of the simplistic individualistic 
assumptions of the American belief system on 
poverty and welfare emerged. 
This vision recognized that although 
welfare is not the major cause of social 
dislocations, efforts should be made to 
facilitate the transition from welfare to work 
for several reasons: welfare recipients prefer 
work over welfare and would readily accept 
jobs that will not result in their slipping deeper 
into poverty;  nonwork or idleness has certain 
debilitating effects on individuals and on 
family life over time; and children are worse 
off if they are widely exposed to an 
environment where few or no people work.   
 21 
Implicit in this vision is the view that work 
is not simply a way to make a living and 
support one's family.  It also constitutes a 
framework for daily behavior and patterns of 
interaction because it imposes disciplines and 
regularities.  Thus, in the absence of regular 
employment, a person lacks not only a place in 
which to work and the receipt of regular 
income but also a coherent organization of the 
present--that is, a system of concrete 
expectations and goals.  Regular employment 
provides the anchor for the spatial and 
temporal aspects of daily life.  It determines 
where you are going to be and when you are 
going to be there.  In the absence of regular 
employment, life, including family life, 
becomes less coherent.  Persistent 
unemployment and irregular employment 
hinder rational planning in daily life, the 
necessary condition of adaptation to a modern 
economy. 
Advocates of this liberal approach, which 
involves the assumption that welfare mothers 
prefer work over welfare, argued that welfare 
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reform should not be undertaken in isolation.  
They maintain that welfare reform should also 
be conjoined with programs to establish 
universal health insurance so that public aid 
recipients who want to "go out there and get a 
job"  do not face the dilemma posed by the 
Chicago welfare mother in 1988 who, to repeat, 
stated:  "I don't like being on public aid.  But 
without a medical card, “what do I do when 
my kids get sick?"  
 Equally important, proponents of this 
liberal approach maintained that welfare 
reform should be tied to efforts to create jobs 
for the disadvantaged. And they supported 
enthusiastically those aspects of social reform 
that are designed to "make work pay," 
principally through the expansion of the 
earned income tax credit (which is a wage 
subsidy for the poor), the creation of universal 
health insurance, the development of child care 
programs, and the establishment of child 
support provisions to ensure contributions 
from absent parents.  
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 All of these subsidies and benefits designed 
to make low-wage work pay were originally 
incorporated into the initial proposals for 
welfare reform discussed by President Clinton 
and his advisers in 1993.   Welfare reform was 
thus part of a more comprehensive agenda of 
social reform.  It was argued that to ease the 
transition from welfare to work it is not only 
necessary to help local government create 
public- sector jobs when private-sector jobs are 
lacking and to turn welfare offices into 
"transitional" centers for training and job 
placement, it is also important to have in place 
universal health insurance to make any kind of 
welfare reform program viable.    
 President Clinton's initial welfare reform 
proposal did, however, include a feature that 
reflected the liberal-conservative consensus on 
reciprocal obligations--namely, that welfare 
receipt should end after two years.  In the 
original Clinton proposal, a welfare recipient 
would be required to undergo training and job 
placement during the two-year maintenance 
period and then accept jobs in the private 
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sector.  If private-sector jobs were not available 
at that time, then a number of public-sector 
jobs would have to be created.   
As UCLA law professor Joel F. Handler 
appropriately noted, the conservatives, as well 
as many others in the nation, "seized on the 
time-limits and paid only lip service to the 
other provisions."   Work preparation 
continued to be talked about, but the all-
important components of guaranteed jobs and 
guaranteed child support at the end of the two-
year period were rarely mentioned.  And the 
lack of concern for these issues was reflected in 
the welfare reform bill that was passed in 1996. 
Indeed, following the Republican landslide 
in the 1994 congressional elections, discussions 
of welfare reform reflected even more the 
individualistic beliefs that many Americans 
hold concerning poverty and welfare, beliefs 
reflecting the view that it is the moral character 
of individuals not inequities in the larger 
society that is the root of the problem, beliefs 
that were embodied in the largely Republican 
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drafted welfare reform bill that Bill Clinton felt 
compelled to sign in 1996.   
This bill, and the recent changes in the 
welfare programs of nearly every state, 
constitute the greatest shift in social policy for 
low-income families with children since the 
Social Security Act of 1935.  The key provisions 
of these new policies--including an end to the 
entitlement to cash welfare benefits, a work 
requirement after two years, and a time limit of 
five years or less--are stricter than any observer 
of welfare policy could have imagined a 
decade ago.   
 Even before the 1996 legislation, welfare 
reform had been progressing through waivers 
that the federal government had granted to 
over 40 states to experiment with new 
programs.  The new federal legislation permits 
states to keep provisions for which they 
received waivers, even if these waivers are 
more restrictive than the provisions in the 
legislation.  For example, many states have 
received approval for “family cap” waivers 
that deny additional cash assistance to 
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recipients who have children while on the 
welfare rolls, and these states may still 
implement the family caps even though the 
federal legislation does not require them.  
Moreover, states are now able to implement 
tough restrictions for which waivers were not 
granted.  For instance, Massachusetts has a 
time limit of only two years of cash assistance, 
not five years. 
 Thus, the stage has been set for an 
unprecedented national experiment: public 
assistance is to be temporary and will no 
longer indefinitely support women staying at 
home.  And during the time they receive public 
assistance, they are required to seek 
employment.  In 1996 many liberals, including 
myself, felt that the passage of this legislation 
would have devastating consequences for the 
welfare poor, including a sharp increase in 
child poverty. 
However, as conservatives are quick to 
point out, the widely predicted disasters 
following the passage of the welfare reform 
legislation have so far not materialized.  
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Contrary to the expectations of many, the 
passage of the 1996 welfare reform bill has not 
removed the nation’s safety net. 
A significant majority of welfare recipients 
are finding employment.  Caseloads have 
dramatically declined (from 12 million in 
August 1996 to about 6 million today, a 50 
percent drop).  And the fixed funding feature 
of the block grants combined with the sharp 
drop in welfare caseloads across the country 
have resulted in surpluses, enabling states to 
either maintain or expand benefits--including 
allowing working mothers to retain more of 
their cash welfare benefits because of more 
generous income disregard rules (that is, rules 
governing the extent to which additional 
income from working will affect the size of a 
mother’s welfare check). 
 The surpluses also enable states to 
liberalize overly restrictive asset limits; invest 
in child care, transportation, and post-
secondary training, especially for families with 
the severest employment barriers; and give 
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wage supplements to a larger number of the 
disadvantaged families. 
And contrary to the liberal prediction, child 
poverty has declined, not increased, since the 
passage of the welfare reform legislation. 
But, I raise this question, would such 
positive outcomes prevail if we had not been 
experiencing this incredible economic boom? 
The timing of the passage of the welfare reform 
legislation could not have been better.  It 
occurred in a period that includes strong 
economic growth, extremely low 
unemployment rates, and increases in the 
minimum wage, all of which enlarged the 
employment and earnings of poor families 
overall. 
Overall, the signs for disadvantaged 
groups in this economy have been 
encouraging.  Real wage growth for low-
skilled workers has been quite impressive since 
1997.  For example, except for male workers at 
the ninetieth percentile of the wage 
distribution, those at the thirtieth percentile 
and below experienced the highest percentage 
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hourly wage increase from 1996 to 1999 
(ranging from 4.7 to 6.4 percent).  Recent 
increases in the minimum wage, which had not 
changed at all from the time Reagan took office 
to 1996, help to account for some of this wage 
growth, but the prolonged strong economy 
undoubtedly contributed. 
Also, the ranks of those in the labor market 
who are out of work for more than six 
months—the long-term jobless-- declined from 
almost two million in January 1993 to 640,000 
in January 2001.  Moreover, the unemployment 
rate of high school dropouts declined from 12 
percent in 1992 to just 6 percent at the end of 
year.  Most of this decline has occurred since 
1997.   Furthermore, the black unemployment 
rate dipped to 7 percent last year, the lowest 
since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began 
compiling comparable unemployment data by 
race in 1972.   
The positive effects of these changes are 
seen in even the most depressed 
neighborhoods of the city.  A recent study of 
low-wage workers in 322 metropolitan areas, 
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by the economists Richard Freeman and 
William M. Rogers, reveals that black men 
aged 18 to 24 with a high school education or 
less--including many with prison records--are 
employed in greater numbers, earning larger 
paychecks and committing fewer crimes than 
in the early 1990s. 
The benefits of a strong economy, 
particularly a sustained tight labor market, for 
low-skilled workers should be emphasized in 
economic policy discussions.  Unlike the 
situation for workers in a tight labor market, in 
a slack labor market—a labor market with high 
unemployment-- employers are, indeed can 
afford to be, more selective in recruiting and in 
granting promotions.  They overemphasize job 
prerequisites and exaggerate the value of 
experience.  In such an economic climate, 
disadvantaged minorities, especially those 
with low levels of literacy, suffer 
disproportionately and employer 
discrimination rises. 
In a tight labor market, on the other hand, 
job vacancies are numerous, unemployment is 
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of short duration, and wages are higher.  
Moreover, in a tight labor market the labor 
force expands because increased job 
opportunities not only reduce unemployment, 
but also draw into the labor force those 
workers who, in periods when the labor 
market is slack, respond to fading job 
prospects by dropping out of the labor force 
altogether.  Thus, in a tight labor market the 
status of all workers—including disadvantaged 
minorities—improves because of lower 
unemployment and higher wages. 
However, there are now signs that the 
economy is slowing down.  This is unfortunate.  
If we could extend this economic boom for 
several more years, it would significantly 
lower the overall jobless rate in areas such as 
the inner-city ghetto, not only for low-skilled 
workers still in the labor force but for those 
who have been outside the labor marker for 
many years as well.  In addition, it would 
enhance the job prospects of many welfare 
recipients who reach the time limit on the 
receipt of welfare. 
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Nonetheless, despite the robust economy, 
there are some groups that are worse off 
because of welfare reform.  The average 
disposable income of the poorest single 
mothers was lower in 1999 than in 1995.  
Between 1993 and 1995 the bottom 20 percent 
of female-headed households experienced 
increases in earning and income.  However, 
from 1995 to 1999, though earnings continued 
to grow, disposable income (income retained 
after payment of taxes) declined largely 
because of declines in the receipt of means-
tested benefits such as food stamps.   
Many mothers leaving welfare fail to 
receive key supports, including Medicaid, food 
stamps, child care assistance, even though they 
continue to be eligible for these services.  There 
has been a substantial decline in the 
participation of the food stamps program and a 
notable decline in the participation of 
Medicaid, despite significant expansion in 
Medicaid eligibility.1 The research suggests 
                                                
1One study reveals that “since the advent of welfare reform in 1996, nearly 
one million low-income working parents in 15 states lost Medicaid coverage, 
mainly as they moved from welfare to work.  This represented a decline of 27 
percent.  We know from work done by the Urban Institute and others that only 
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that many families who no longer receive cash 
aid or are discouraged from seeking cash 
assistance may not be aware that they remain 
eligible for food stamps and Medicaid. 
Despite a strong economy, progress in 
reducing the depth and severity of child 
poverty halted between 1995 and 1999.  During 
this period the number of poor children only 
slightly declined and on average those who 
remain poor became poorer.  Many low-
income families experienced significant 
earnings gains between 1995 and 1999 only to 
see them offset by the declines in means-tested 
benefits, leaving them no better off 
economically in a booming economic period.  
Finally, in a research project that I am co-
directing that includes a survey of about 2,500 
children and their caregivers in low-income 
neighborhoods in Boston, Chicago, and San 
Antonio, seventeen percent of all families that 
had received welfare in the previous two years 
reported that their benefits had been reduced 
                                                                                                                                            
about one-fourth of parents moving from welfare to work have employer-
sponsored health insurance so it is fair to assume that the vast majority of 
parents who lost Medicaid are now uninsured.”  Statement of Joan C. Alker, 
Associate Director of Government Affairs, Families USA, 9/15/00. 
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or eliminated because the welfare office said 
they weren’t following the rules.   The most 
common reasons were missing meetings – 
usually with caseworkers – or failing to file 
required paperwork such as earnings records.  
Less commonly, some had refused to cooperate 
with child support enforcement or had not 
complied with other rules, and, contrary to 
expectations associated with the American 
belief system on poverty and welfare, only a 
very small percentage had refused to take a 
job. 
 We found that the penalized parents, when 
compared to all other current or recent welfare 
recipients, showed more signs of distress.  
They had less education and poorer health.  
They reported lower monthly incomes and 
were more likely to have used food pantries 
and emergency clothing services and to have 
had times when they couldn’t afford enough 
food.  They were more likely to have problems 
with substance abuse.  Their housing was of 
poorer quality; and they were more likely to 
live in neighborhoods with abandoned houses, 
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assaults and muggings, gangs, and drug 
dealing in the open. 
 Moreover, parents who left the rolls 
because the welfare office said they didn’t 
follow the rules were far less successful in 
finding jobs than were parents who left welfare 
for other reasons.  Only 36 percent of the 
former group were employed at the time of our 
interview, compared to 67 percent of the latter 
group. 
 Our interviews and observations suggest 
that most of the penalized parents had daily 
lives filled with complex family obligations, 
challenging work responsibilities, or personal 
turmoil.  These broader difficulties made it 
harder for them to satisfy the welfare rules. In 
our study, about half were able to get their 
benefits back; nevertheless, in these three cities, 
sanctions and case closings for infractions were 
clustered among families that, on average, 
were more vulnerable than other welfare 
families.  Some of these families lacked the 
resources to navigate the program rules.   
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Moreover, although mothers who have left 
TANF, including the vast majority who were 
not sanctioned, have an average employment 
rate of 63 percent after leaving,1 this average 
obscures significant variation across different 
groups of women, some of whom have done 
much better than the average and some of 
whom have done much worse.  Women with 
lower levels of education, poorer health status, 
with younger children, and who are 
themselves young have considerably lower 
rates of employment and post-welfare income 
levels than women with higher levels of 
education, better health status, with older 
children, and who are older themselves.  
Outcomes also differ among those leavers who 
have a history of greater welfare dependence.  
The employment rate and, especially, the level 
of income among these leavers are 
considerably worse than average.   
The existence of significant numbers of 
women who have not fared well after leaving 
welfare should be a source of concern, 
especially given the strong economy.   If they 
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are struggling now, what will happen to these 
women when the economy does indeed slow 
down, as current signs suggest?  These leavers 
deserve the attention of policy makers who 
will soon be considering, under 
reauthorization, modifications in welfare 
programs or will be designing special 
programs to assist those former welfare 
recipients who are in greatest need. 
Accordingly, it is premature to declare 
welfare reform a successful experiment.  We do 
not know what will happen to these families 
and other low-income families, including 
welfare-reliant families, when the economy 
returns to normal or when we enter a period of 
economic stagnation. 
Finally, our research has uncovered 
problems confronting welfare and former 
welfare recipients in the transition from 
welfare to work that are rarely discussed in the 
media.  For example, ethnographic data that 
our researchers have collected in San Antonio 
suggest a close relationship between mother 
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absenteeism and tardiness on the jobs, on the 
one hand, and childhood illnesses.    
It seems that the kids in many of the homes 
in poor neighborhoods are constantly sick.  
These illnesses are undoubtedly related to 
inadequate health care, poor housing 
conditions, and unsanitary physical 
environments--environments where flies and 
maggots breed, where the plumbing is stopped 
up and not repaired, where open sewers are 
found, and where rats bite helpless infants.  In 
such environments the conditions of life are 
often brutal.  In such environments many 
children have persistent low-grade fevers and 
infectious diseases spread easily and rapidly. 
Also our ethnographic research in Boston 
reveals that the problem of finding adequate 
child care is one of the most stressful 
experiences of poor working mothers.  Given 
the tight labor market, the turnover of workers 
in child-care facilities is huge.  The wages for 
child-care workers is relatively low and the 
strong economy has enabled many of these 
workers to seek and find higher-paying 
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employment.  The end result is that many 
mothers discover to their dismay that their 
children are not receiving quality care in these 
child-care settings.  For example, when one 
harried mother arrived to pick up her child at a 
Boston day-care center, she discovered that her 
child was being taking care of by the janitor 
because several of the child care providers 
failed to show up. 
The child illnesses and problems of 
adequate health care create considerable stress 
among mothers who on the one hand worry 
about getting to work or getting to work on 
time and, on the other hand, try to deal with 
the illnesses of their children or the problems 
of their child care.  And many employers, 
influenced by the American belief system on 
poverty and welfare, are quick to attribute the 
mothers’ tardiness or absence on the job to a 
poor work ethic. 
In the final analysis, we should not ignore 
the point that the welfare reform bill has been 
in effect for only a short period of time during 
one of the most remarkable economic periods 
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in recent memory.  Even in the best of times, 
some groups are experiencing real difficulty.  
We should all be concerned about the lack of 
preparation in many states for addressing the 
problems that will surface when we return to 
normal economic times or, even worse, when 
we enter a recession or a period of economic 
stagnation.  
We have been inundated with all the good 
news about welfare reform, it is now time to 
raise the consciousness of Americans, 
particularly those who strongly subscribe to 
the American belief system on poverty and 
welfare, about the bad news, especially the 
potentially bad news if the economy turns 
sour.  Thank you. 
 
                                                
1
 Our research is designed to evaluate the consequences of welfare reform 
for the well-being of children and families and to follow these families as welfare 
reform evolves.  The study comprises three interrelated components: (1) a 
longitudinal survey of approximately 2,500 families with children in low-income 
neighborhoods, about 40 percent of whom were receiving cash welfare payments 
when they were interviewed in 1999.  These families represent a random sample 
in each city of poor and near-poor families who live in low-income 
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neighborhoods.  In addition, at the 36 month mark, a second sample of about 
1,250 families, focused primarily on young parents who are just coming of age 
and encountering the welfare system for the first time under the new rules, will 
be selected and interviewed;  (2) an embedded developmental study of a subset 
of about 630 children age two to four in 1999 and their caregivers, which 
consisted of video-taped assessments of children’s behaviors and caregivers-
child interaction, observations of child-care settings, and interviews with fathers; 
(3) an ethnographic study of about 215 families not in the survey (but residing in 
the same neighborhood) who will be followed for 12 to 18 months using in-depth 
interviewing and participant observation and subsequently interviews.  About 45 
of the families in the ethnography will include a child with a physical or mental 
disability.    A detailed description of the research design can be found in Welfare, 
Children and Families: A Three City Study.  Overview and Design Report, available at 
jhu.edu/~welfare or in hardcopy upon request.  The principal investigators of 
this project are Ronald Angel, University of Texas; Linda Burton, Pennsylvania 
State University; Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, Northwestern University; Andrew 
Cherlin, Johns Hopkins University; Robert Moffitt, Johns Hopkins University; 
and William Julius Wilson, Harvard University. 
  
 
